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A LITIGATION PRIMER FOR STANDING
DISMISSALS
JOHN

H. GARVEY*

Professor Carvey examines a very theoretical issue-whether standing objections are
jurisdictional, claim-related, or both-to resolve a rery practical problem-hotc to
characterize motions to dismiss for lack of standing, As he notes. the choice of
characterizationunder the Federal Rules of Ciril Procedurehas important practical
consequences for the litigator, involving cridentiary limitations, consolidation requirements, and the resjudcata effcct of dismissal. ProfessorCarrey suggests. as a
solution to the litigator's dilemma, that both rule 12(b kI and rule 121b t16 are
appropriatemeans by which to raise standing objections in the constitutional sense
since a determination that the plaintiff lacks standing means both that the court
lacks jurisdiction and that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim On the other
hand, since prudentialstanding objections rest on the very considerationsthat determine whether a court will infer a right of action, they should be treated as
entirely claim-related and therefore should be made under rule 12(b 6) only.
INrRODUTION

It is symptomatic of the confusion which plagues the law of
standing that even after the past decade of intense litigation of the
question, the Supreme Court is heard to say that the issue of standing is one which "may be jurisdictional."
That means, I suppose,
that it may not be; and if not, it is rather clear that the only other
taxonomic possibility makes it an integral part of the plaintiffs 2 claim
or cause of action. 3 Exactly which label is to be applied-or rather,
when one label rather than the other is appropriate-has real
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentuekd. A.B.. 1970. Notre Dame University.
J.D., 1974, Harvard University. © 1980 by John H. Garvey and New York University Law
Review.
1 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (emphasis added).
2 1 omit as not germane discussion of those cases in which a defending party seeks standing
to raise a particular issue, not access to court. See. e.g., United States v. Painer. 100 S Ct.
2439, 2444 (1980) (respondent lacked standing to exclude evidence from his own criminal trial
that had been seized in violation of a third party's fourth amendment rights), McCovan-. ,
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961) (litigant may assert only his own constitutional rights.
Sunday closing laws caused litigant economic harm but did not abridge his freedom of religiont.
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S, 249. 255 133a.
See generally P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & ff. WVechsler. Hlart and Wclsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 184-214 (2d ed. 1973).
3 See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief, 83 Yale L.J. 425, 426-29 (1974).
545
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significance at the appellate level; 4 but the problem is even more
pressing in the trial courts since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
5
attach important consequences to the choice of description.
A glance at the reported cases recently decided in the lower federal courts reveals no consistent pattern. One finds courts both
sustaining 6 and denying 7 the contention that lack of standing is a
jurisdictional defect that may be asserted by motion under federal
rule 12(b)(1). Just as frequently, though, defendants will object that
lack of standing amounts to failure to state a claim, and will seek 8 and
at times obtain 9 dismissal under rule 12(b)(6). Scholarly commentary
on the litigator's dilemma is virtually nonexistent, though at least one
suggestion has been made that the issue, while at all times jurisdictional, cannot conveniently be accommodated by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure unless some amendments are made. 10
There is no need to confuse the issue further by adding another
category to rule 12(b), an action which might suggest that standing is
not claim-related and not really jurisdictional either."' Rather, it
4 Proper characterization will determine whether the standing issue may be raised at
the appellate level. If standing is characterized as a jurisdictional issue the defendant may raise
it at any time, even after the trial court has rendered a final judgment. See French Renovating Co. v. Ray Renovating Co., 170 F.2d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1948); Marin v. University of P. .,
377 F. Supp. 613, 631 (D.P.R. 1974) (motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4)). Since the question of jurisdiction remains open after judgment, an appellate court may
even raise the issue sua sponte. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S.
178, 188-90 (1936); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 430 n.5. (9th Cir. 1978). On the
other hand, the defense of failure to state a claim is waived if not asserted at some point during
the trial; appellate courts generally will not consider the sufficiency of the complaint after judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2); see Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587, 591
(8th Cir. 1949); Snead v. Department of Social Servs., 409 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
s See text accompanying notes 15-46 infra.
6 See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 445 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (D.D.C.), aff'd on other grounds,
580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); Mease v. Heinz, 80 F.R.D. 119,
121 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (prudential standing limitations); Prince George's County v. Levi, 79
F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Md. 1977).
7 See, e.g., Unihealth Servs. Corp. v. Califano, 448 F. Supp. 1059, 1060 (E.D. LaI. 1978);
De Jesus v. Ward, 441 F. Supp. 215, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
8 See, e.g., Rental Hous. Ass'n of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills, 548 F.2d 388, 391 (1st
Cir. 1977); McCloskey v. McCloskey, 450 F. Supp. 991, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Cramer v.
General Tel. & Elecs., 443 F. Supp. 516, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 259 (3(d Cir.
1978).
9 See, e.g., Solinger v. A & M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1978);
Bernstein v. Somekh, 452 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Owen of Georgia, Inc. v.
Shelby County, 442 F. Supp. 314, 317-19 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); School Crossing Guards Ass'n v.
Beame, 438 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hauer v. Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 425
F. Supp. 796, 799-800 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Upland Freightlines, Inc. v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,
[1977-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,791 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
10 See Bernstine, A "Standing" Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1979
Wash. U.L.Q. 501, 514-20 (1979).
11The proposed amendment would require that a motion to dismiss for lack of standing be
brought prior to a judgment on the merits. Once a final judgment is rendered, the verdict
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should be acknowledged that standing in its constitutional sense is
both jurisdictional and claim-related, and a motion to dismiss for lack
of constitutional standing may properly question both the court's subject matter jurisdiction' 2 and the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim. 1 3
Standing in its prudential aspect is a separate question. Prudential
limitations are morphologically analogous to the rules governing implied rights of action and should be treated, as the latter already are,
as entirely claim-related for purposes of consideration under the Federal Rules.' 4

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHOICE
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES

The distinction between jurisdictional and claim-related issues is
made in rule 12(b), which states: "Every defense, in law or fact, . . .
except that the
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading ....
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, ... (6) failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... " Naturally, one
seeking to make a standing objection by such a motion will be concerned about what to call it, especially since it has to be done in
writing' 5 and since the court will want to know that it is the kind of
defense which can be made by motion rather than in an answer. The
suggested form for making a 12(b) motion, form 19, seems to make a
point of identifying the appropriate subsection of rule 12(b) for each
of several defenses, and a conscientious moving party will want to do
likewise. Of course, that kind of uncertainty is not going to provoke
would not be vulnerable to direct or collateral attack on standing grounds, even when the
plaintiff at all times lacked standing. See Bernstine, supra note 10, at 520-21. As Professor
Bernstine admits, however, standing has a dear article III component, and therefore would

come within the general rule that subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental predicate of the
court's power to bear a case, and may not be created even by agreement of the parties. Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939); see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 1350, at 546 (1969) [hereinafter Wright & Miller]. An
amendment proscribing postjudgment attacks on plaintiffs standing, when the deficiency was
jurisdictional, would result in binding judgments being issued by courts admittedly incompetent
to hear the case. This is precisely the result which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought
to avoid, as inconsistent with article III's grant of judicial power to the federal courts. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see 5 Wright & Miller, supra, §§ 1214, 1393.
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
13

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)[6).

Motions for dismissal because of prudential standing limitations therefore should be
brought under rule 12(b)(6).
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1).
14
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the Advisory Committee to convene an extraordinary session, and
there are solutions to the litigator's quandary. One which has been
tried is simply to label the motion as one under "rule 12(b)" and
leave the classification problem to the courts,' 6 which after all have
created the standing muddle themselves. And if all else fails, the
moving party can rest assured that even when the judge disagrees
with his choice of label, the mistake won't be fatal given rule l's
mandate that the Rules be construed to "secure the just, speedy, and
17
inexpensive determination of every action."
A slightly more annoying problem is presented by the last sentence of rule 12(b):
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not

excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 ....
There is no similar provision for conversion of a rule 12(b)(1) motion
into a summary judgment proceeding, a fact which did not escape the
eye of Justice Brennan in Warth v. Seldin. 18 He dissented from the
Court's dismissal on the pleadings for want of standing but, believing
that standing questions did not go the merits, said that the motion to
dismiss was not converted into summary judgment 19 by the introduction of affidavits and documents. Although Justice Brennan is surely
correct in saying that the last sentence of rule 12(b) operates only to
convert 12(b)(6) motions into motions for summary judgment, 20 his
suggestion that matters outside the pleadings should not be introduced on motions other than those under 12(b)(6) 21 is somewhat
harsh. 22 There never was any doubt about the propriety of introducing matters outside the pleadings to assist a court in resolving the

16

See, e.g., Hall County Historical Soc'y v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 447 F. Supp, 741,

744 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 430 F. Supp. 855, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Person
v. New York Post Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1297, 1302 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Not infrequently, judges simply relabel a motion which is improperly
denominated. See note 22 infra.
18 422 U.S. 490, 527 n.6 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19 Id. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 53 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
20 See 5 Wright & Miller, supra note 11, § 1366, at 676.
21 422 U.S. at 526-27.
22 Most trial courts convert any challenge to the sufficiency of plaintiffs claim into a summary judgment motion if the original motion is supported by material outside the pleadings. In
short, the denomination may be irrelevant. See Kaufman v. Scanlon, 245 F. Supp. 352, 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (12(b)(1) motion converted to rule 56 summary judgment motion; defendant
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other issues listed in rule 12(b). 23 It was only the common-law bar
against "speaking demurrers" 2 which led to anomalous treatment of
motions alleging failure to state a claim. 25 But even if the characterization of a standing objection does not determine whether extrinsic
evidence is admissible at all, it does determine whether the court
should apply the evidentiary limitations imposed on summary judgment proceedings-but not on otherwise dispositive motions not
26
going to the merits-by rule 56(e).
Still more serious questions arise from the waiver provisions in
rule 12(h)(2) and (3):
(2) A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ... may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered

under Rule 7(a), or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at
the trial on the merits.
(3) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action.

challenged the sufficiency of the plaintiffs claim when he thought he was challenging the court's
subject matter jurisdiction). See also Papastefan v. B & L Constr. Co., 356 So. 2d 158. 160 (Ala.
1978) (applying state law analogue of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Brosie v. Stockton. 105 Ariz.
574, 576, 468 P.2d 933, 935 (1970). Thus, district courts have exhibited more flexibility in
reading rule 12(b) dismissal motions than Justice Brennan would admit.
23 See cases cited in 5 Wright & Miller, supra note 11. § 1364. at 662 n.S. But see
Winkleman v. New York Stock Exch., 445 F.2d 786. 788 (3d Cir. 1971) tThis rule [12,1b1Jl1
makes no provision for matters outside the pleading.").
24 See C. Clark, Code Pleading 514 (2d ed. 1947). J. Koffler & A. Reppy. Common Law
Pleading 387 (1959).
25 A controversy arose soon after the enactment of the Federal Rules over whether rule
12(b)(6) motions had to be made only on the basis of the pleadings. or could be supplemented
by extrinsic materials. Some courts took thp position that rule 12b)(6) merely codified the old
common lav demurrer with its ban on the use oF affidavits and other material not included on
the face of the pleadings. See, e.g., Kohler v. Jacobs, 138 F.2d 440. 441 (5th Cir. 1913). Cohen
v. United States, 129 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1942). Other courts held that it enacted an
entirely new pleading procedure which allowed "speaking demurrers" in which extrinsic e'idence was admissible. See, e.g., Carroll v. Morrison Hotel Corp.. 149 F.2d 404. 407 (2d Cir.
19455); Lucking v. Delano, 129 F.2d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 1942). In 1948. the rule was amended to
eliminate this confusion by expressly permitting rule 12b)(6) motions to be supplemented by
materials extrinsic to the pleadings. See Advisory Comnittee Note to the 1946 Amendment to
Rule 12(b); 5 Wright & Miller, supra note 11. § 1364. at 668-69. § 1366.
26 5 Wright & Miller, supra note 11, § 1364. See also Garvey. The Attorneys Affidavit in
litigation Proceedings, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 191, 192 n.7. 196 (1979) (courts on a preliminary
motion generally will accept evidence by affidavit that would not be admissible at trial. a practice in which they do not engage when hearing rule 56 motions).
And although a court may accept evidence by affidavit relating to a summary judgment
motion, it will not make findings of fact determinative of such a motion if a genuine and material factual controversy exists. Rather, the court must set the issue for trial. See Manetas v.
International Petroleum Carriers, Inc., 541 F.2d 408. 413-14 (3d Cir. 1976). Radohenko v.
Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1975). This limitation does not app y
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The aim of the provisions is to define the point in the proceedings
after which the specified defense is lost. And the obvious distinction
between 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) defenses is that only the latter survive
completion of the trial on the merits in the district court. Although it
is not entirely clear what is encompassed by "the trial on the
merits," 27 it is at least certain that motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim may not be made for the first time after judgment.2 8 By
contrast, it is well accepted that objections to subject matter jurisdiction may first be raised by motion for relief from the judgment under
rule 60(b)(4), a provision which is unrestricted even by the one-year
29
limitation generally imposed by rule 60(b).
A subsidiary point which emerges from the rule 12(h) waiver
provisions is that objections to jurisdiction may be made either by the
parties "or otherwise," meaning, of course, that the court may make
the suggestion on its initiative. 30 This should hardly be surprising
since the underlying policy rests not on any interest of the parties but
on an institutional concern about the judiciary acting beyond its competence. 3 1 But it is an unusual exception to the general rule that
control over the litigation rests with the parties, even when their laxity or stupidity results in judgment on a claim for which the law
would not otherwise afford relief. In contrast, the practice of dismissing a suit sua sponte for failure to state a claim, although not

when the jurisdiction of the court is questioned; the court may hear the issue and make findings
of fact necessary to decide the motion. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 (1947); Shahinoon
Indus., Inc. v. Imperato, 338 F.2d 449, 451 (3d Cir. 1964); 2A Moore's Federal Practice §
12.14, at 2336 (1974).
27 Compare Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Record Corp., 109 F. Supp. 330,
333-34
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (motion -after trial but before judgment is proper) with Black, Sivalls & Bryson,
Inc. v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587. 590-91 (8th Cir. 1949) (motion forjudgment notwithstanding the
verdict improper); Snead v. Department of Soc. Servs., 409 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (post-judgment motion improper), vacated on other grounds sub noi. New York Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. Snead, 425 U.S. 457 (1976); Evening News Publishing Co. v. Allied
Newspaper Carriers, 160 F. Supp. 568, 576 (D.N.J. 1958) (motion after trial hut before judgment improper), aff'd on other grounds, 263 F.2d 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 929
(1959).
28 See note 4 supra.
29 See, e.g., French Renovating Co. v. Bay Renovating Co., 170 F.2d 945, 946 (6th Cir.
1948); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n of Chicago, Inc., 86 F.
Supp. 526, 527 (N.D. Ill.
1949); cf. Restatement of Judgments § 7 (1942) (judgment void if
rendered by a court which lacks jurisdiction).
30 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1256 (3d Cir.
1977), aff'g, 413 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Kamsler v. Zaslawsky, 355 F.2d 526, 526 (7th
Cir. 1966); Stockheimer v. Underwood, 428 F. Supp. 192, 195 (W.D. Wis. 1977), Morrison v.
Morrison, 408 F. Supp. 315, 318 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
31 This policy is graphically illustrated by the rule that the parties may not confer jurisdicti'on by consent, Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939).
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unknown in the federal courts, is a step to be taken guardedly and
32
with proper precautions for the submission of the parties' views.
A further distinction relevant to the proper characterization of
standing objections is tied to the use of the word "suggestion" in rule
12(h)(3) to describe the procedure for putting forward a jurisdictional
defense. Since it would have been just as easy to say "whenever it
appears by motion of the parties or othervise," what the drafters
must have meant is that it does not matter how the deficiency is
brought to the court's attention; it could be in a letter, "3 a pretrial
memorandum, 34 a formal "suggestion," 35 or otherwise. 3 6 Indeed,
any further requirement would be superfluous since the court may
act on its own without a motion. But this lax treatment of jurisdic37
tional defenses further complicates the problem of the moving party
who worries about what his papers should look like.
The use of the word "suggestion" also presents problems of timing when it is read together with rule 12(g), requiring consolidation of
defenses in any motion made under rule 12. That section means that
if, for example, the defendant moves in advance of answer for a more
definite statement, or to dismiss for improper venue, he may not
make a second preanswer motion based on rule 12(b)(6). 38 But rule
12(g) does not prevent the defendant from making a "suggestion" that
the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. 39 The distinction
will never be crucial since rule 12(h)(2) affords at least three later
opportunities to make an objection to the claim. 4 0 But a mistake can
32 See, e.g., Haggy v. Solem, 547 F.2d 1363, 1364 (8th Cir. 1977); Dougherty v. Harpers
Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Literature, Inc. v. Quinn, 482 F.2d 372, 374
(1st Cir. 1973); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992-93 (3d Cir. 1973); Dodd v. Spokane
County, 393 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir. 1968); Barnes v. Dorsey. 354 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Mo.
1973); 5 Wright & Miller, supra note 11, § 1357, at 593.
3 See Puente v. Spanish Natl State, 116 F.2d 43, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 314

U.S. 627 (1941).
4 See McGonigle v. Baxter, 27 F.R.D. 504, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
35 See Camper & Nicholsons, Ltd. v. Yacht "Fountainebleau II," 29,2 F. Supp. 734, 735
(S.D. Fla_ 1968).
36 See Williams v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see S.S. Kresge
Co. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 1404, 1405-07 (Cust. Ct. 1972).
37 See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
38 See United States v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., I F.R.D. 606, 606 (D. Del. 1941); cf.
Goff v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 667, 668 (D. Md. 1970) (successive motions challenging venue and service of process not permitted).
39 See Graske v. Johnson, 97 F. Supp. 678, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); 5 Wright & Miller, supra
note 11, § 1385.
40 The purpose of rule 12(h)(2) is to preserve the defense of failure to state a claim, among
others, until a judgment on the merits has been reached. See McLaughlin v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 5 F.R.D. 87, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Rule 12(h)(2) therefore provides that such a defense may
be raised not only in a motion under rule 12(b)(6), but also ina responsive pleading such as an
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result in an order that the befuddled moving party pay his opponent's
41
costs incurred while opposing an unconsolidated motion.
One final reason for concern about the proper characterization of
standing arises from the res judicata effect of involuntary dismissals. A
dismissal for lack of standing may or may not bar plaintiff from reasserting the claim since the last sentence of rule 41(b), concerning
involuntary dismissals, provides:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.
It is accurate but not very helpful to say that this rule does not mean
what it says. The term "jurisdiction," for example, has been stretched
far beyond its ordinary sense of the competence of the court, to cover
things like whether the plaintiff is the real party in interest. 42 And a
dismissal under rule 12(b)(6), although falling within the scope of the
phrase "any dismissal not provided for in this rule," is one which
some courts have found to have a preclusive effect, 4 3 and others
not. 44 It is nonetheless safe to say that dismissals on jurisdictional
grounds will almost certainly not be considered to have been made
"upon the merits," 4 5 while those made for the reason specified
in
answer, in a rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, and in a motion to dismiss at trial.
See 5 Wright & Miller, supra note 11, § 1392, at 860-61. In addition, some courts have allowed
the defense to be raised by a motion for summary judgment. See Ilorwitz v. Food Town, Inc.,
241 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. La. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 367 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1966); cf. 2A Moore's
Federal Practice
12.22, at 2445 (1974) (motion to dismiss for faihre to state a claim may
technically be brought as summary judgment motion, but would be contrary to the spirit of rule
12(g)).
41 Cf. Munson Line, Inc. v. Green, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 56g.1, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (costs
allowed for summary judgment motion not made in good faith).
42 Myers v. Westland Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (D.N.D. 1949), rev'd on other
grounds sub non. Nelson v. Westland Oil Co., 181 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1950). The case is cited
with approval in Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 288 (1961).
43 See, e.g., Hall v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 512 F.2d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 1975); Asher v.
Harrington, 461 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1972); Durham v. Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc., 404
F.2d 864, 865 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 998 (1969).
44 See, e.g., Brazier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 256 F.2d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1958); Estevez
v. Nabers, 219 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1955); Russo v. Sofia Bros., Inc., 2 F.R.D. 80, 81-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum);
Rambur v. Diehl Lumber Co., 144 Mont. 84, 93, 394 P.2d 745, 750 (1964) (interpreting
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure); 9 Wright & Miller, supra note 11, § 2373, at 239.
15 See Mann v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 488 F.2d 75, 76 (5th Cir.
1973); Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 1959); Topping v. Fry, 147 F.2d 715, 718
(7th Cir. 1945); Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 151 F. Supp. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Such
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction therefore would not bar plaintiff from reasserting the claim In
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rule 12(b)(6) will likely be preclusive 4 6 even if made at the pleading
stage.

All that has been said indicates that it would be good to know
how to characterize the standing objection in rule 12 terms. But the
discussion has rested on the unspoken assumption that standing must
be crammed into one or another of the categories offered by rule
12(b)(1)-(7), however uncomfortable the fit. To some degree, that assumption is justified by the first sentence of rule 12(b), which says
that "the following defenses" may be made by preanswer motion, apparently indicating that items not on the list may not. But, of course,
the Rules themselves authorize other kinds of preanswer motions,
47
some of which may be characterized as "defenses" or "objections,"
even if most cannot. 48 And it is not uncommon for local court rules
to authorize motions not provided for by the Rules, though such matters generally are far removed from any issues in the case, 4 9 and, in
any event, reliance on local rules would be a fairly haphazard way of
coping with the standing problem. More to the point, courts frequently grant motions for stays, or for abstention, or occasionally to
dismiss because of the pendency of another action, although none of

a more appropriate forum. See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606. 603 (5th Cir. 1977.
Ripperger v. A.C. Allyn & Co., 37 F. Supp. 373, 374 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 113 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940). For a contrary result, in which the trial court dismissed with
an explicit statement that the dismissal was with prejudice, see Weissinger v. United States.
423 F.2d 795, 799-800 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
12.14, at 2337 (1974) (dismissal of an action because the
46 2A Moore's Federal Practice
complaint fails to state a claim is res judicata for that claim); see Mullen v. Fitz Simons &
Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 172 F.2d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 1948). cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959
(1949). See also Lawhorn v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 299 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982) (res judicata as to all
issues which might have been raised in the complaint).
47 Some which are defensive motions include: rules 12(c) (more definite statement); 12f)
(motion to strike); and 56(b) (summary judgment for defending party). Others not explicitly
provided for, but rather plainly contemplated by the Rules, may be made to enforce provisions
like those in rules 10 (form of pleadings) and 11 (signing of pleadings). c. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65
(injunctions).
48 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (enlargement of time); 15(d) (supplemental pleadings); 21 (add or
drop a party); 25 (substitution of party); 30(a) (permission for plaintiff to take deposition prior to
30 days after service of summons and complaint); 31(a) (motion to shorten time for taking deposition on written questions); 33 (motion to require answers to interrogatories in less than allowed time); 34(b) (motion requesting production of documents or entry on land in less than
allowed time); 35(a) (physical or mental examination); 36(a) (request for admission In less than
prescribed period).
49 See, e.g., Local Court Rule 14(b), Eastern District of California (security for costs); Local
Court Rule 2(e), Southern District of Illinois (approval of security) Local Court Rule 6, Western
District of Kentucky (security for costs); Local Court Rule 37, District of Massachusetts (special
orders for the protection of litigants in widely publicized cases); Local Court Rule 2. Southern
District of New York (security for costs); Local Court Rule 25. Western District of New York
(security for costs).
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those grounds fits very adequately within any of the categories enumerated in rule 12.50 Unlike standing objections, however, motions
of those kinds are clearly outside the specified objections: they are
surely not jurisdictional since such issues present problems only in
cases in which the federal court plainly has jurisdiction, and the
choice not to decide rests not on a finding that the claim is without
merit but on a decision that it should be adjudicated elsewhere, if
possible. 51 Furthermore, motions of the type just mentioned do not
present most of the problems which could result from the fIilure to
categorize. Because they are based on considerations of judicial administration and federalism which do not go to the merits, the issue
of conversion to summary judgment and use of the evidentiary standard set out in rule 56(e) does not arise. For the same reason, dismissal in a case of Burford-type abstention 52 or in situations in which
another action is pending will never have the preclusive effect that
might otherwise be required by rule 41(b). Again, because the
reasons for grant or denial of such a motion are largely extrinsic to
the rights of the parties, it is easy to see that the point is one which
53
may be raised by the judge without prompting from the parties,

50 See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817-20 (1976) (dismissal; state action pending); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (abstention ordered on judge's own motion until state
supreme court could determine state law question); Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,
256-59 (1936) (stay; another action pending in federal court); Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp.,
471 F.2d 1304, 1308 (1st Cir. 1973) (motion for stay pending arbitration); Partnow v. Moran,
359 F. Supp. 519, 524-25 (D. Del. 1973) (abstention); Gentry v. libernia Bank, 152 F. Supp.
469, 472 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (dismissal; another action pending). But see Ainsworth v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Okla. 1969) (motion for
dismissal ruled improper); 2A Moore's Federal Practice 12.07 (2], at 2263 (1974) (improper to
raise pendency of another action by motion to dismiss).
51 It goes without saying that the defendant's objection is not described by the other subsections of rule 12(b), which deal with personal jurisdiction, venue, process, and service, and
failure to join an indispensable party.
52 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). In "Burford" abstention, the court
dismisses the suit to avoid needless conflict with the state's administration of its own afldrs.
53 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 (1959),
East Coast Lumber Terminal, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106, 109-11 (2d Cir. 1949).
The matter of waiver is a complex one, on which some specific directions might well be
helpful. But it is not at all clear that it could be solved in any homogeneous fashion applicable
to every kind of motion being discussed. For example, motions for stay or dismissal because
another action is pending become irrelevant once a certain quantum of judicial effort has been
expended, but when that point is reached could depend on contingencies such as the rate at
which a parallel action was proceeding. The federalism concerns implicated in some abstention
cases could survive any decision in the district court if a stay were ordered pending appeal. Tie
same would be true of the policy against unnecessary decision of constitutional questions. For
that reason such issues should perhaps be ones which could be raised for the first time on
appeal.
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and could be brought to the court's attention not just by formal motion appropriately entitled, but in virtually any manner.
The better analogy for deciding how to treat motions attacking
standing is the approach the courts have taken to motions seeking
dismissal for lack of capacity. Like standing, the capacity issue does
not fit very well within the enumerated categories of rule 12(b). Despite the fact that rule 9(a) contenplates that objections to lack of
capacity will be raised in the answer,5 4 it seems settled that the same
defense may be put forward by motion when the relevant facts appear
on the face of the complaint. 55 In such cases, it seems to be the
established practice to identify the motion with one of the classes
found in rule 12(b)-most commonly 12(b)(6) 5G-for purposes of de57
ciding such questions as whether to convert to summary judgment,5 9
58
what the appropriate evidentiary standard is, when waiver occurs,
when consolidation is required,6 0 and so on.
In short, finding the right 12(b) label for standing motions is not
necessarily required by the Rules. But the typical extra-rule motions
which have been permitted share two qualities which are not characteristic of standing motions: they are substantially unlike any of the
enumerated defenses and objections; and the failure to categorize
them does not result in serious problems of description, conversion,
evidentiary standards, waiver, initiative in presentation, consolidation, and preclusive effect. In cases like capacity in which the objection is more closely related to the enumerated defenses and
objections, the practice has been to fit the motion into the most
appropriate class and resolve such problems accordingly. The confusion about whether standing issues are jurisdictional or claim-related
calls for a resolution of that sort.
54 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(a) states: "When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to

sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment. which
shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleaders knowledge.55 See, e.g., Jacques Krijn en Zoon v. Schrijver. 151 F. Supp. 955, 956-57 (S.D.N.Y. 195;
Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods. Inc.. 119 F. Supp. 603, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1954);
Becker v. Buder, 79 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E. D. Mo. 1948); Coburn v. Coleman. 75 F. Supp. 107,
109 (W.D.S.C. 1947); cf. Brush v. Harkins, 9 F.R.D. 604, 605 (%.D. Mo. 1949) (motion correct
but insufficient facts on the face of the complaint to decide it).
56 See, e.g., Kebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294. 296 & n.1 (2d Cir.
1965); Wood v. Circuit Court, 331 F. Supp. 1245, 1246 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Weiner v. Vinters.
50 F.R.D. 306, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Banks v. Employers' Liability Assurance
Corp., 4 F.R.D. 179, 180 (W.D. Mo. 1944) (motion should challenge cours jurisdiction).
57 See Weiner v. Winters, 50 F.R.D. 306, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
', See Banks v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.. 4 F.R.D. 179, 181 (W.D. Mo. 1944).
-9 See Coburn v. Coleman, 75 F. Supp. 107. 109 (\%.D.S.C. 1947).
60 See 5 Wright & Miller, supra note 11, § 1360. at 641.
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II
ARTICLE III JURISDICTION AND THE
OUTER LIMITS OF STANDING

If we are to take what the Supreme Court says at face value, it
should be undisputed that part of the complex of standing issues is

jurisdictional in a constitutional sense. The most extended discussion
of that question in recent years was Justice Powell's effort in Warth v.
Seldin 6l to summarize the law:
In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability:
whether the plaintiff has made out a "case or controversy" between
himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III.... The
Art. III judicial power exists only ... when the plaintiff himself
has suffered "some threatened or actual injury resulting from the
putatively illegal action ... "62

Put another way, the jurisdiction which article III permits Congress
to vest in the federal courts does not extend to situations in which the
plaintiff cannot allege: (1) injury, and (2) causation by the defendant. 63 In addition to the explicit language of its opinion, the Court
61 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
62 Id. at 498-99 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)).
6
It was a while before the Court came to this formulation of the matter, but from the
beginning it has maintained that there is a jurisdictional component to standing. See, e.g.,
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923) ("the cases must be disposed of for want of
jurisdiction"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) ("in terms of Article III limitations on
federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought
to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution"); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) ( "since the
question of standing goes to this Court's jurisdiction . . . we must decide the Issue");
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("standing in the
federal courts is to be considered in the framework of Article III"); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159, 164 (1970) ("petitioners ... have the personal stake and interest that impart the concrete
adverseness required by Article III"); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
211 (1972) ("injury is alleged with particularity, so there is not present the abstract question
raising problems tinder Art. III of the Constitution"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 173 (1974) ("Art. III requirements are the threshold inquiry"); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) ("justiciability, which expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon the federal courts by the 'case or controversy' requirement of
Art. III, embodies both the standing and political question doctrines"); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) ("Absent .. .a showing [of injury redressahle by
the court], exercise of its power by a federal court would he gratuitous and thus inconsistent
with the Art. III linitation."); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan llous. Dev. Corp., 429 US.
252, 260-61 (1977) ("The essence of the standing question, in its constitutional dimension, is ...
[that the] plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant .. . [and] that the injury is indeed fairlv traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions.");
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'I Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (article III
requisites for standing include "not only a 'distinct and palpable injury' . .. but also a 'fairly
traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.").
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has demonstrated that it considers at least those two elements to be
jurisdictional by raising the standing issue on its own motion, 64 a
practice in which it does not engage when the omitted defense or
65
objection goes to the merits.
An even clearer indication that the Supreme Court thinks that
the issue is one of jurisdiction and not the merits is found in Dorernus
v. Board of Education.6 6 In Doremus, the New Jersey Supreme
Court had decided, at the behest of two citizen-taxpayers, 67 that a
state law providing for reading the Old Testament at ie beginning of
the school day did not violate the establishment clause. The unsuccessful plaintiffs' appeal to the United States Supreme Court was
dismissed for lack of standing. But the Court noted that its action left
the state court's decision unaltered, 68 a plain indication that it
thought lack of standing had no relation to the merits of the plaintiffs'
constitutional claim.
In short, then, the jurisdiction which article III gives to the federal courts is limited to "cases" and "controversies," and the Supreme
Court has indicated that those concepts in turn presuppose the existence of injury and causation. For example, economic harm to a protected interest can be an injury sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
requirements of standing; 6 9 so too is the loss of satisfaction suffered
by a user from injury to the environment. 7 0 On the other hand, the
constitutional injury threshold bars claims that one is merely deprived
of the psychological satisfaction of knowing that government officials
are acting according to law.7 1 Causation questions fall along a similar
spectrum. A mere allegation that the defendant engaged in unlawful
conduct does not present a constitutional "case" unless there is the
requisite degree of proximity between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's injury. A claim by a taxpayer in town X that his taxes

64 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411. 421 (1969).
65 See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278-79 (197M); 5 Wright &
Miller, supra note 11, § 1394.

342 U.S. 429 (1952).
One of the plaintiffs also had a daughter in school at the time of the state court litigation.
Although the Supreme Court seemed to feel that alone would not help the plaintiffs much, any
additional issues which it created were moot by the time the case %as argued in the Supreme
Court since she had graduated. Id. at 433.
68 Id. at 434.
69 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1970); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co.. 390
U.S. 1, 6 (1968); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1915).
70 United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973); cf. Sierra Club v. Morton. 405
U.S. 727, 735-36 (1972) (standing denied because of lack of personal injury).
71 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974); Ex Parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam).
66
6
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are higher because town Y discriminates in its zoning policies fails
that test.

72

What is salient about all this for our purposes is that the very
concepts which the Court has made the shibboleth for recognizing
standing-causation and injury-in-fact-are, at least with respect to
private law, essential to the notion of "claim" or "cause of action."
Suppose, for example, that the hospital negligently gives me the
wrong baby to take home, and that I am emotionally upset when I
discover the error several days later. My suit against the hospital
might well be dismissed even though the hospital violated a duty
which it legally owed me, not because a court would not have jurisdiction over the case, but because the kind of injury I suffered was
too tenuous and indefinite to be compensable-i.e., because I failed
to state a claim. 73 The same might happen if I found a dead mouse
74
in my milk.

The same result-dismissal for failure to state a claim-might
occur if I could not establish causation by the defendant. As Prosser
puts it: "An essential element of the plaintiffs cause of action for negligence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some
reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant
and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." 7 5 Suppose not
only that I find a dead mouse in my milk, but also that three weeks
later I die of cancer. If, as I suspect is likely, there is no connection
between mousy milk and cancer, 7 6 an action by my estate would be
dismissed, again not for lack of jurisdiction, but for failure to state a
claim.

77

This means that the very elements that the Court has identified
as prerequisites to article III standing also are requirements for stating many claims at common law. Since there does not seem to be any
reason why those same elements should not be central to the existence of the kind of public-law claims which most often give rise to
72 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975). See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights

Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-46 (1976).
73 See, e.g., Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 235, 249 P.2d 843, 844-45
(1952); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 54, at 328-30 (4th ed. 1971).
74 See Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 341 Mass. 216, 222-23, 168 N.E.2d 80, 84-85

(1960).
75 W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971).
76 Though I wouldn't be surprised to find that mice fed 400 times the normal human dose of

milk would contract it.
77 On the relation between standing and claims for relief generally, see 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.07 (1958); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-22, at 98 &
n.6, 111-12 (1978); Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 Yale L.J. 425 (1974).
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standing problems, 78 the solution to this aspect of our problem -how
to categorize motions to dismiss for lack of standing-is to say that
the objection is both jurisdictional and claim-related. As long as a
successful motion may be characterized in either way, litigants should
be able to choose whichever rule has the harsher consequences for
the plaintiff. 7 9 If, for example, a standing objection is not raised
until after judgment, the judge should consider that lack of standing
deprives the court of jurisdiction, and entertain the motion.8 0 Ifa
subsequent action is brought in state court after a federal suit is dismissed for lack of standing, the rules of bar and issue-preclusion
should be applied as though the first action decided-as in fact it
did-that the plaintiff's claim was insufficient as a matter of law. The
same approach would resolve the problems of description, initiative
in presentation, and consolidation. Whether a preanswer motion
could be converted into a motion for summary judgment, and what
evidentiary standards should be applied to matters outside the pleadings, might present slightly more difficult problems since it would not
be clear a priori which procedure would be more likely to result in
dismissal. But, since an adverse result would preclude further litigation by the plaintiff, it probably would be best to follow the procedure employed for rule 12(b)(6) motions.
I can see no reason not to follow this approach and say that the
plaintiffs claim lacks merit because it fails to allege an injury (or causation), and that for the same reason the federal courts do not have
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court feels differently, however, and has
said so on several occasions. In Schlesinger v. Reserrists Committee
to Stop the War,8 ' for example, it found that the plaintiffs-the
Committee and some of its members who were citizens, reservists,
and taxpayers -had no standing as citizens or taxpayers to sue to

78 That seems to be precisely the %-ay things are done in the law of public nuisance, in
which the failure to allege or prove particular damage may be treated indifferently as a lack of
standing or the absence of an essential component of the plaintiffs cause of action. See National
Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Johnson, 317 F. Supp. 1330. 1334-35 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Kemper v.
Cooke, 576 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Compare W. Prosser. Handbook of the Law
of Torts § 88, at 586-91 (4th ed. 1971) Ca private individual has no action for the invasion of the
purely public right, unless his damage is in some %.ay to be distinguished from that sustained by
other members of the general public") with Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 216-17 (1974).

79 Just as the defensive team in football may choose a 15- rather than a 5-yard penalty when
the offense is charged with both dipping and offsides.
80 This avoids the problem created by Bernstine's proposed standing amendment. see note
11 supra.
81 418 U.S. 208 (1974). In addition, see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166. 174
(1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614. 619 n.6 (1973).
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enjoin violations of the incompatibility clause because they suffered
no article III injury from the Reserve membership of members of
82
Congress. The Court characterized its dismissal as jurisdicational,
and chastised the district court for making "an appraisal of the merits
before the issue of standing was resolved." 83 What the district court
had done was to conclude "that respondents' interests as citizens
were meant to be protected by the Incompatibility Clause because
the primary purpose of the Clause was to insure independence of
each of the branches of the Federal Government." 84 I, for one, have
a difficult time seeing that conclusion as any more an "appraisal of the
merits" of their claims than was the Supreme Court's own conclusion
that respondents' interests as citizens in the enforcement of the
incompatibility clause were not meant to be judicially protectible,
whatever other interests the clause might protect.
The suggestion that a dismissal might be both on the merits and
jurisdictional is not at all strange. It's not too different from being
unable to enter a bicycle in the Kentucky Derby because it's too
slow, and anyway, it's not a horse. Moreover, it is fairly consistent
with our accustomed way of thinking about some other kinds of jurisdictional dismissals, such as those in which a plaintiff unsuccessfully
tries to ground his complaint on a federal question. Suppose, For
example, that I sue the state Department of Motor Vehicles arguing
that compulsory automobile insurance deprives me of property without due process of law. One fatal flaw in such a claim is that my
rights against the state are defined by the state's rather unimposing
duty to pass only those laws which have a reasonable relation to some
legitimate state interest. 8 5 Such a complaint fails to state a claim
because it indicates no duty which the defendant has failed to fulfill.
At the same time, if the fourteenth amendment offers virtually no
protection against compulsory autonobile insurance, there is some
sense in saying that my claim does not "arise under" the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States, as required by article III and
28 U.S.C. § 1331,86 and that I am deprived of no "right" mentioned
in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). So my complaint is faulty for both jurisdictional and claim-related reasons.

82 418 U.S. at 215.
84

Id. at 226.
id.

85

This would be analogous to saying, for private law purposes, that I can't collect from my

83

neighbor if I'm bitten by a snake while crossing his lot, because he had no duty to warn me or
unknown dangers. See generally W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 58 (4th ed. 1971).
86 Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31-32 (1933).
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One gets the impression from reading the cases, however, that
inquiries about "arising under" questions are divided into two stages:
one first determines the existence of jurisdiction by asking simply
whether the federal claim is not frivolous. That established, all remaining issues go to the merits. 8 7 What I have said up to now by no
means implies that all dismissals on the merits-for failure to state a
claim-are also jurisdictional. Whether the court has power to decide
the case should not turn on what its decision would be.8 8 But I do
mean to say that all standing dismissals for want of a "case" or "controversy," and all dismissals for want of a nonfrivolous question "arising under" the Constitution, laws, or treaties, determine both the
court's power to decide and the plaintiffs right to relief, and consequently are both jurisdictional and claim-related. It is easy to get
the opposite impression from the cases dealing with dismissal for
want of a substantial federal question since the sole emphasis is always on the jurisdictional aspects of the dismissal. But such cases
generally have concerned the need to empanel a three-judge court,8 9
or the existence of pendent jurisdiction,9 0 questions which make the
existence of jurisdiction critical. Though the Supreme Court does not
seem to have had occasion to say so, it has at least intimated that
such dismissals determine the merits of the plaintiff's claims as
wvell. 9 1

87 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). In Bell, the Court held that, once an "arising
under" claim was alleged, the district court was required to hear the case:
For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment
on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. \'hether the complaint
states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law ... [that]
must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.
Id. The claim therefore must be patently without merit to wvarrant dismissal before trial.
88 See Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 305 (19-23).
89 See, e.g., McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21, 28-32 (1975); Coosby v. Osser. 409
U.S. 512, 518-23 (1973); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31-32 (1933).
" California Water Serv. Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1935); see. e.g.,
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 nn.12 & 13 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397.
402-04 (1970); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 104 (1933).
91 See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246. 249
(1951) ('Even a patently frivolous complaint might be sufficient to confer power to make a final
decision that it is of that nature, binding as res judicata on the parties.-); Binderup v. Pathe
Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 305-06 (1923) 'Jurisdiction, as distinguished from merits. is %vanting
only where the claim set forth in the complaint is so unsubstantial as to be frivolous, or in other
words, is plainly without color of merit.... In that event the claim or Federal right under the
statute, is a mere pretence and, in effect, is no claim at all.").
The idea that such dismissals go to the merits is reinforced by the Supreme Court's practice of dismissing appeals for want of a substantial federal question. It is a bit treacherous to
equate the Supreme Court's dismissal of cases for lack of appellate jurisdiction %ithdismissals at
the trial level, given the unquestioned element of discretion in the former decision, see, e.g..
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In short, it is perfectly reasonable to say that if the plaintiff cannot allege injury and causation-the criteria by which constitutional
standing is tested 92 -then the action should be dismissed both because the plaintiff fails to state a claim (rule 12(b)(6)) and because the
court lacks jurisdiction (rule 12(b)(1)).
III
THE PRUDENTIAL ASPECT OF STANDING

The last section began by stating that the Supreme Court had
indicated that at least part of the complex of standing issues is jurisdictional in a constitutional sense. More recently, the Court has distinguished a second set of standing cases which rest on prudential,
rather than constitutional, considerations. 93 Prudential concerns exist
when the plaintiff asserts a generalized grievance held in common by
all or at least a large group of citizens, 94 or when the plaintiff bases
his claim to relief on the "legal rights or interests of third parties."0 15
Without such limitations-closely related to Art. III concerns but
essentially matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would be
called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance

P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 648-49 (2d ed. 1973); Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12-14 (1930); Hart, Foreword The
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 89 (1959); Ulman & Spears, Dismissed for
Want of a Substantial Federal Question, 20 B.U.L. Rev. 501, 528-29 (1940), and the fact that
different jurisdictional statutes are involved. It is probably safe to say, nevertheless, that any
case presenting a federal question so frivolous that a district court would lack jurisdiction also
would fall outside the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See Newburyport Water Co. v.
Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 575-76 (1904). And although the Court consistently terms dismissals for want of a substantial federal question jurisdictional, see Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174,
176 (1922); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 311 (1902), the Court also
has said emphatically that such dismissals are also decisions on the merits, Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975); see R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 197 (4th ed.
1969).
92 See text accompanying notes 61-72 supra.
93 See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dec. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499-501 (1975); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 154 (1970). See also Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).
94 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-17 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173-74 (1974) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 329 U.S. 83,
114 (1968)).
95 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 490, 499. See also Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46
(1943).
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even though other governmental institutions may be more compeintervention
tent to address the questions and even though judicial
90
may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.

That the barrier to standing in such cases does not rest on article
III is clear from the Court's recognition that the barrier may be
breached in appropriate situations, and the controversy heard and determined. The assertion ofjus tertii, for example, will be permitted
when a litigant can show that compliance with a legal duty would
result in the dilution of the rights of a third party. 97 It may also be
allowed when "the law that imposes the duty on the third parties
both infringes their constitutional rights and alters their behavior in a
way that injures the claimant." 9 8 In the same way, a court may entertain a generalized grievance which is no different from that held by
the public at large without violating the principle of separation of
powers if Congress has authorized standing.9 9 Moreover, although
the issue of judicial competence presented by lack of article III jurisdiction is so crucial that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, 10 0 the Court has held that the failure of the parties and tie
lower courts to raise prudential considerations will permit it to disregard such constraints on appeal. 10 '
Although it may be clear that standing objections based on prudential considerations are not rooted in article III and therefore are
not jurisdictional in the constitutional sense, we still must determine
how they should be characterized for purposes of dismissal motions
under the Federal Rules. Let us begin with an observation made by
Justice Powell in his majority opinion in Warth v. Seldin:
96 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500.
97 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976)- Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park. 396
U.S. 229 (1969); cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 510 (standing might have been allowed if
enforcement of challenged statute would result in violation of third party's rights$. Note. Stand(disctussing c-ases
ing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423. 431-33 W19741
recognizing risk that denial of standing would dilute the rights of third parties).
98 Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Ilarv. L Rev. 4"23. 433-34 J1974f.
see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925).
99Examples may be found in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. I 1977D (-any
person may commence a civil action on his own behalf... against the Administrator whIere
chapter
there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this
which is not discretionary with the Administrator"); the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1976). as
amended by Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 St-at. 1366 (1980)). and the Freedom of Information Act. 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501. L Tribe, Amencan Constitutional Law § 3-18, at 80 (1978); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Alundonment.
62 Cornell L. Rev. 663, 665-80 (19T77).
100 Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 125. 126 (1804).
101 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976).
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Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the
plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, ...
it often
turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.... [T]he
source of the plaintiff's claim to relief assumes critical importance
with respect to the prudential rules of standing that, apart from
Art. III's minimum requirements, serve to limit the role of the
courts in resolving public disputes. Essentially, the standing question in such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as
granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial re02
lief.'

If Justice Powell's language sounds vaguely familiar, there is a
reason. "[W]hether the constitutional or statutory provision ...
grant[s] persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief" is a
question the Court is accustomed to considering when it is asked to
infer (or, as lawyers say, imply) a cause of action. 10 3 The inquiry
becomes necessary when the particular constitutional 104 or statutory' 0 5 provision on which the plaintiff relies does not clearly suggest
that it is to be enforced by a private right of action by one in the
plaintiff's position.
The notion, to which I adhere, that a decision about the existence of prudential standing is precisely the same undertaking as a
decision about an implied right of action, is one which the Supreme
Court has resisted-albeit only halfheartedly.1O° Just recently it announced, in Davis v. Passrnan,10 7 that
standing is a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary
to a defendant to create an Art. III case or controversy, or at least
to overcome prudential limitations on federal-court jurisdiction
. . .; cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is

422 U.S. at 500 (citations omitted).
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389, 397 (1971); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-22, at 98 n.6 (1978); Tushnet, The
New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 663, 673-76 (1977).
104 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v,
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment).
1o
See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (Investment
Advisors Act of 1940); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Education Amendments of 1972); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
106 See generally Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell
L. Rev. 663, 673 (1977).
102

103

107

442 U.S. 228 (1979).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 1980]

STANDING

a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law,
appropriately invoke the power of the court ....108
On the other hand, the Court has freely interchanged the terms
"standing" and "right of action" in several "implied right of action"
If the
cases;109 more to the point, it did so in Warth c. Seldin. 11
hisof
that
just
ancient
latest pronouncement, in Passman, makes all
tory, we are entitled to ask what the Court now believes distinguishes
the two concepts. Justice Brennan's statement quoted above suggests
that prudential limitations present in essence a question of "sufficient
adversity" and not a "matter of law." I am not sure that, stated so
compactly, the definition makes any' sense, but I assume that what he
meant was this: in deciding prudential standing cases the courts look
only to see whether the parties are likely to fight conscientiously
enough-and perhaps in a sufficiently concrete setting-to develop
the case to a point at which it is suitable for judicial resolution; on the
other hand, in deciding whether there should be an implied cause of
action, the courts ask whether, quite apart from the vividness of the
dispute, the plaintiff has a constitutional or statutory right to judicial
relief arising from the defendant's violation of some specific duty. If
that is a fair paraphrase, I think the idea is mistaken. Not only does
the standing issue in its prudential aspects turn largely on the existence of a "cause of action" in the conventional sense, but the decision to imply a private right of action is strongly influenced by the
adequacy with which the parties will present the issues.
Before elaborating, let me point out why this is germane to our
issue. As I suggested at the start, courts should classif'y standing objections under the most analogous subsection of rule 12(b). 111 If, as I
argue below, a prudential standing objection raises the same issues as
an objection that the plaintiff has no implied right of action, we may
resolve our classification problem by looking at how the courts treat
implied rights of action. Now, it seems to be perfectly clear that
whether or not there is an implied right of action is a rule 12(b)(6)
matter. Congressman Passman thought so; 112 the Supreme Court

108 Id. at 239 n.18 (emphasis in originals). See also National ILIL Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456, 465 n.13 (1974).
109 See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35-36. 38, 42 n.28. 43 & n.31. 44,
45 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 743. 754 (1975). id. at 761
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of H.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. at 466-72 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
110 422 U.S. at 500 & n.12, 501.
"I1 See text accompanying notes 54-60 supra.
112 442 U.S. at 232.
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explicitly agreed.113 The Court found
it equally clear that the ques4
tion was in no sense jurisdictional.1
Both those conclusions make good sense. In Cort v. Ash, 1 15 for
example, the Court said that stockholders had no right of' action
under federal law against directors who had made corporate contributions in a presidential election, in part because the statute making
such conduct illegal was intended primarily to protect the general
public by reducing corporate influence over elections. 1 6 That seems
a lot like saying that a restaurant in a business district has no right of
action against a zoning board which improperly grants McDonald's a
variance in an adjacent residential district because the zoning ordinance was not meant to protect the plaintiff from competition. 117 In
each case, an essential element of the plaintiff's claim is lacking: an
allegation that the defendant violated a duty owed to the plaintiff. If
dismissals on prudential standing grounds rest on the same foundation, they too should be considered claim-related-and sought by
12(b)(6) motions-and not jurisdictional. There are several reasons
why I think they do.
Although there are marked differences in the implication process
between constitutional and statutory claims (the chief one being the
element of congressional intent 118), the courts in both situations have
some element of discretion in defining the statutory or constitutional
rights of the parties. In making this decision, courts take three
policies into account. First, and perhaps most crucial, is the importance of securing the intended protection to any class specifically described by the relevant constitutional or statutory provision. 119 For
example, the courts are far more likely to imply a cause of action
under a statute saying "employees shall have the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives" 120 than they are

113 Id. at 239 ("this cause of action is a necessary element of his 'claim' "). See also Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 680 n.2 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727 (1975); 13 Wright & Miller, supra note 11, § 3562 (Supp. 1980).
114 442 U.S. at 236-37.
115 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

Id. at 81-82.
See Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920
(1949); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 635-36 (1971).
I1 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979).
1'9 See id. at 242-44; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n. 13 (1979). In tho
context of statutory implication, this element is the object of the first inquiry suggested In Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
120 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944)
(Railway Labor Act).
116

117
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under one which merely lays down the "dut\" of every common carrier . .. to establish . .. just and reasonable rates."12
Second,
there is a corresponding interest in leaving to executive or administrative action the protection of the public at large in eases in which
violations of duty work a general harm.' 2 2 The reason is not so much
that individuals have no enforceable rights if they proceed separately,
as that permitting private enforcement is unlikely to bring to the attention of the court all considerations relevant to the public interest,
and so may provoke redress of a specific claim by a decision which,
publicly speaking, is inefficient. 12 When the government does not
have the resources to make public enforcement satisfactory, though,
the inadequacies of private actions are likely to be discounted, and an
individual right of action permitted.' 2 4 Third, the courts are concerned that their implication of rights of action, though not inconsistent with the intentions and objectives of the federal government,
may unnecessarily displace state control over matters which basically
concern the states.2
Those considerations, whose calculus constitutes the implication
process, largely define the contours of the prudential standing rules
as well. Though their current vitality is the subject of some confusion, 126 the "nexus" and "zone of interests" requirements which the
T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464. 469. 472 (1959) tMotor Carners Acti.
See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States. 359 U.S. 464 (19-59). MontanaDakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co.. 341 U.S. 246 (195D cf. Piper %.Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40-45 (1977) (private right of action allowed for shareholders but not
defeated tender offeror since latter would not effectively advance policy of the Williams Act).
123 See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour. 421 U.S. at 422 See also
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers. 414 U.S. at 463-64.
Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co.. 341 U.S. at 251.
124 See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426. 432 (1964). See also Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 706-08 & n.42; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections. 393 U.S. 544. 556 (1969).
In the context of statutory implications, this element is the object of the third inquiry suggested
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
125 This is the last facet of the Cori inquiry for statutory implication casws. See 4"2' US. at
78. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago. 441 U.S. at 70S. Piper %. Chris-Craft Indus,.
Inc., 430 U.S. at 40-41; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak. 377 U.S. at 434. But it is also a matter of
interest in cases of constitutional implication. See Bhiens %.Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388. 394-95 (1971).
126 The Court held in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina En t'l Study Group, Inc.. 43S U.S. 59.
80-81 (1978), that it would not require a nexus between the claimed injury mad the nght asserted when the litigant was himself the ightholder. The redundance of the "zone of interestshas been widely noted, and more than one -writerhas pronounced it dead even in the Court's own
mind. See K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 22.19-1 (ist ed. Supp. 1930), Albert. Standing to
Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Belief. 83 Yale LJ.
42-5, 493-97 (1974); Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 69. 81 (197m. Sedler, Standing.
Justiciability. and All That: A Behavioral Analysis. 25 \'nd. L. Rev. 479. 4S6-91 (19721. See also
121
122
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Court has used to implement the concept of prudential standing bear
a striking resemblance to the factors just discussed in connection with
implied causes of action. Consider first the "zone of interests" test.
Basically an attempt to free the law of standing from the restrictions
imposed by the old "legal right" requirement, 12 7 the zone test asks
only "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 128 The Court
has said that this test asks a question which is different from the
merits, 129 and so it does: arguably having a protected interest is a
very different thing from actually having one, so winning against a
standing objection is no guarantee against losing on the merits. But to
dismiss a claim as not within the zone is to say that the claimant is
not even arguably protected or regulated, to say, in other words, that
he clearly has no right to relief.
When that happens, though, it seems to me that the court has
made precisely the same determination as it would make in undertaking the first implication inquiry, that is, whether protection for a
specific class is provided by the statute or constitutional provision.
Examples are scarce, for reasons I will mention presently, but consider first Clinton Community Hospital Corp. v. Southern Maryland
Medical Center.130 Plaintiff-hospital sued the Medical Center and
the Secretaries of HUD and HEW to avoid competitive injury from
construction of the Medical Center nearby; the basis for its claim was
that the construction violated the National Environmental Policy Act
and other statutes. The court of appeals held that even if that were
true (though it was not), the hospital had no standing to sue since its
concern was not within the zone of interests protected by the Act,
and it consequently had failed to state a claim. 131 That, like the first
implication inquiry in Cort v. Ash, seems precisely like saying that a
restaurant in a business district has no right of action against a zoning
board which improperly grants a variance to another restaurant in an
adjacent residential district, because the zoning there was not meant
to benefit the plaintiff.

Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-78 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting). But see Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 n.6 (1979).
127 Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939); see J. Vining, Legal
Identity; The Coming of Age of Public Law 20-33 (1978).
128 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150. 153 (1970).
129

Id.

130 510 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir.) (per curam), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975).
131 Id. at 1038.
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The only significant difference between the prudential standing
and the implication inquiries is one of degree: the "zone of interests"
requirement is far more expansive and easily met. Few cases have
flunked it, 13 2 and the Supreme Court, by suggesting that references
to legislative history are inconsequential in determining the scope of
the zone,' 3 3 has made sure that few others will. But this means only
that the "zone of interests" question is rather pointless in the vast
majority of cases. By asking about "arguable" protection and avoiding
legislative history, it merely postpones the more rigorous inquiry
which must follow: whether the plaintiff actually has a cause of action
134
against the defendant.
If the "zone" test matches up with the implication inquiry concerning the protected class, the "nexus" test-the second criterion
for prudential standing-is designed to avoid the kind of representational problems that the second implication policy addresses. In its
best recognized form the nexus requirement acts to bar suits by taxpayers who seek to protect the public at large from a general harm. It
does so by making two demands: (1) that the plaintiff attack only an
exercise of the taxing and spending power, not an incidental expenditure of tax funds to administer a regulatory statute; and (2) that the
statutory or constitutional limitation allegedly exceeded be a specific
limit on the taxing and spending power, not just the outer bound set
by the delegation of powers to Congress in article I, section 8.135 The
first aspect automatically acts to narrow th range of cases in which
the public interest may be asserted by taxpayer-plaintiffs. The reason
seems to be an extension of the article III concern for adversit, and
concreteness: generally, spending cases are more likely to have a direct impact on the pocketbook; and when that is assured the litigation
is more likely to revolve around the interests of the parties involved

132 And most of those that have did so, like Clinton Community. for being outside the zone
of interests protected by the National Environmental Policy Act. See, e.g.. Port of Astoria v.
Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 476 (9th Cir. 1979); Hiatt Crain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland. 446 F. Supp.
457, 488 (D. Kan. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523
F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam); ef. Drake v. Detroit Edison Co.. 453 F. Supp. 1123.
1129 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (Atomic Energy Act). Compare Rlasmussen v. Hlardin, 461 F.2d 595.
599-600 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972) (consumers of milk products are not within
the zone of interest of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act) with Snntex Dairy v.
Bergland, 591 F.2d 1063, 1067 (5th Cir. 1979) (producers are within tile zone of interest of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act). See generally K. Davis. Administratne Law of the
Seventies §§ 22.02, .11, at 510, 515 (1976).
13 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (per curiainm.
134 See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief, 83 Yale L.J. 425, 493-97.
135 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
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in a specific controversy. In a somewhat different way, the second
nexus requirement expresses the concern of the implication cases that
isolated litigants may upset political balances with which the most
affected segments of society may be happy. 1 36 A comparison of Flast
v. Cohen 137 and Frothinghamn v. Mellon 138 provides a useful illustration. In Flast, the Court found that the plaintiff-taxpayers had satisfied the second aspect of the nexus requirement because they alleged
that the federal expenditures under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 contravened the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment, which the Court saw as specific
limits on the spending power.' 3 9 In Frothingham, the Court disallowed standing to challenge the Maternity Act of 1921 because the
claim was that the expenditure exceeded the powers delegated to the
federal government by the Constitution. "In essence, Mrs. Frothingham was [a third party] attempting to assert the States' interest in
their legislative prerogatives and not a federal taxpayer's interest in
being free of taxing and spending in contravention of specific constitutional limitations."140 Put another way, when a party objects to an
expenditure by asserting a right it makes sense to permit standing
because the various unrepresented interests affected by a decision
one way or another become, in a sense, irrelevant; 1,l but when the
objection is based on a matter of policy the very nature of the decision to be made demands that the litigation not go forward without
adequate representation of all affected interests.
In addition to using the nexus requirement in taxpayer suits,
courts have employed it to prevent a party claiming "injury in fact"
from seeking redress by asserting a violation of the rights of
others. 14 2 There must, in short, be a nexus between the injury asserted and the right which is the litigant's ticket to judicial redress.
136 By precluding challenges to the spending power based on the federalist limits inherent In
art. I, § 8, Flast seems to make those questions "political" in the sense in which Gibbow; tr
Ogden suggested that all implied limits on the enumerated powers are political: "rite wisdom
and the discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at election, are, in this, as in manv other instances, as that, for example, of
declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them From its abuse." 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 86-87 (1824).
137 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
138 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
139 392 U.S. at 105.
140

Id.; see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-22, at 98-99 (1978).

141 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 82-86, 90-94 (1977).
142 1 should caution that the Court has not used the term "nexus" to describe tile rule to

which I now refer. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59
(1978), the Court spoke as though the rule against third-party standing is something different
from the nexus requirement. See id. at 80. In using the term in the text, I am following the

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

October 1980]

STANDING

Here, even more clearly than was true of taxpayer suits, the purpose
of the requirement is to ensure that the claims of tie surrogate do
not obscure the interests of absentees.1 4 3 But, in traditional terms,
the basis of a dismissal under these circumstances would be that the
plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Suppose, for example, that I was
crossing the street in the middle of the block and was hit by a car
driving on the left-hand side of the road. The injury which I sustain
would be very real, and unquestionably caused by the defendant. But
unless I could prove some independent act of negligence, I might
well be told by the court that the only people who have a right to
demand that the defendant keep on the other side of the street are
drivers who were travelling in the opposite direction, and that I am
not entitled to relief simply because their rights were violated.1 4 4 Put
another way, the defendant would be entitled to object that I failed
to allege or prove an essential element of ny action for negligencethat he had breached a duty owed to me-and could secure a dismis1 45
sal on the merits for failure to state a claim.
I already have noted a final point of congruence between the
nexus test and the second policy which operates in implication cases:
despite the general rule against permitting the plaintiff to assert
claims on behalf of another, or the public at large, the courts have
been quite willing to do so when it is demonstrably necessary to pro14 G
vide adequate protection for unrepresented interests.
The last policy which is considered in implication cases is the
concern about displacing state control over matters which basically
interest the states. It is true that one sees little evidence of that policy in cases which the Supreme Court has treated under the rubric of

lead of Professor Tribe, who has argued persuasively that the two are really congruent. See L
Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-23, at 100-01 (1978). His understanding of -nexus"
seems to have been confirmed by the Duke Power decision. notwithstanding what the Court
says. The really significant conclusion of Duke Power is that it is unnecessary to ask for a nexus
between the injury and the right asserted when the litigant is himself the rightholder. That
suggests that the Court is concerned with the connection only in third-party situations land tax
cases).
143 See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 8S liarv. L. Bev. 1667.
1732-33 (1975).
144 See Westlund v. Iverson, 154 Minn. 52, 191 N.W. 25
(1922).
145 See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief, 83 Yale L.J. 425, 438-42 (1974); Jaffe. Standing Again. 84 Harv. L Rev. 633,
636-37 (1971).
146 See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 6S2-84 (1977h Craig v. Boren. 429
U.S. 190, 192-97 (1976); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-26 (1978; text accompanying notes 122-24 supra. It will be allowed also when Congress has expressly permitted a right of
action, although in the latter case implication is unnecessary because the plaintiff's cause of
action is made explicit by the relevant statute. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
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prudential standing, but that is perhaps only a matter of coincidence.
To begin with, federalism concerns have played no part in the implication cases brought to challenge action by federal agencies or officials, 14 7 for the obvious reason that the states have no inherent
interest in taking jurisdiction over the federal government itself.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that discussion of state interests
is absent from the large number of prudential standing cases against
federal defendants. 148 In the second place, the Court has indicated
that the existence of a state interest in exclusive regulation is essentially irrelevant when the plaintiff asserts a cause of action under a
provision of the United States Constitution. 1 49 Consequently, it is
hardly surprising to see no reference to state interests in independent
lawmaking and enforcement in prudential standing cases grounded on
constitutional claims. That leaves only statutory prudential standing
cases against private individuals or state officials, and all of those
cases have happened to fall under the Fair Housing Act, 15 0 which the
Court has read "'to define standing as broadly as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution.'"'151 In short, the Court has had limited opportunity to consider whether federalism concerns should be
considered in prudential standing cases.
147 See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); National R.R. Passenger Corp, v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); cf. Securities Investor Protection Corp.
v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (no private right of action). But see Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1971); Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647 (1963). Even in Wheeldin, in which the Court discussed the availability of state
sanctions for abuse of power by federal officials, it was acknowledged that federal law supplied
defenses which set an outer limit to the control which might be imposed on federal authority.
Id. at 652.
I might add that even if there were such a state interest, it would not turn up in most of
these cases because the Court has terminated the standing inquiry once it was satisfied that tie
plaintiff is "'arguably" within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated.
148 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617
(1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1971); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
149 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23-25 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
224, 241-44 (1979); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1971).
The Supreme Court intimated, in Davis v. Passman, that the difference is as follows: the
statutory implication process is essentially an exercise in discerning congressional intent (in
which, I need add, it is presumed that Congress did not intend to displace state law); congressional intent, however, plays no role in determining fundamental constitutional rights, and tle
presumption of accommodation to state law disappears. 442 U.S. at 241-44.
150 See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93-99 (1979); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972).
151Id. at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971) (Civil Rights
Act of 1964)).
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STANDIN

I have been attempting to demonstrate that the notion of
prudential standing which the Court has recently begun to define is
basically no different from the idea of an implied constitutional or
statutory cause of action. If both rest on the same grounds and serve
the same purposes, it should make sense to suppose that the former
is, as the latter is admitted to be, claim-related and not in any sense
jurisdictional. Thus, the defense of lack of standing for prudential
reasons should be governed by the complex of rules which attend
rule 12(b)(6) motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION

By adopting the methodology now used to classify motions dhallenging a litigant's capacity-looking for an analogous category within
rule 12(b)-litigators can determine the proper characterization of
standing dismissals under the Federal Rules. The initial inquiry is
whether the standing objection rests on constitutional grounds or on
prudential limitations governing a court's willingness to hear a case. If
the plaintiff lacks standing in the constitutional sense his complaint is
faulty both because it fails to state a claim and because the court lacks
jurisdiction. Consequently, both rule 12(b)(6) and rule 12(b)(1) motions are appropriate.
A different conclusion follows from my analysis of prudential
standing limitations. Since, as the Court has made clear, such limitations are in no sense jurisdictional and since the definition of prudential standing replicates the process by which implied rights of action
are determined, it makes sense that the former ought to be considered, as the latter presently are, claim-related. Rule 12(b)(6),
therefore, is the appropriate vehicle for making prudential standing
objections.
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